British 8th Infantry Division on the Western Front, 1914-18 (2024)

Journal of the Society for Army Historical research, 2016

MICHAEL DUREY For the past thirty years historians have focused on examining the processes involved in turning the British Army into a war-winning force by the second half of 1918. The trajectory of the army's development as it discovered and implemented a successful combined arms strategy has sometimes been described as a 'learning curve'. This concept embraces much more than battlefield tactics and includes analysis of the development of military doctrine and training programmes; logistics; the use of new technology; and command and control at the higher echelons of the BEF (divisions, corps and armies). 1 The learning curve has had its critics and even some of those who accept its basic premise see it as more like a rollercoaster than a smooth upward curve. 2 All, however, acknowledge that the process accelerated with the Battle of the Somme, when the enormous quantities of military hardware essential for success-not just shells for the artillery but Lewis guns and trench mortars for the infantry, tanks and better aeroplanes for the RFC-became available and the "new" British Army underwent its first major trial in an offensive campaign on the continent. 3 Moreover, the full arsenal of military arms required to achieve battlefield success only arrived in the middle

Historian, 2006

This article traces the evolution of the various strategies of attrition employed by the German, French and British armies on the Western Front in the First World War. It links the wartime approaches to pre-war ideas of battle and shows how these pre-war ideas influenced thinking during the war.

in Anthony King (ed.), Frontline: Combat and Cohesion in the Twenty-First Century (Oxford University Press), 2015

Chapter Eight explores the role of morale in the military strategic process and demonstrates, for the first time, how it is possible to construct a methodologically sound quantitative approach for assessing morale in an historical battle context (the British Army’s progress through Northwest Europe in 1944/5). It proposes a functional conceptualisation of morale, which focuses its meaning and relevance on motivation and the willingness to act in a manner required by an authority or institution. These approaches, at least when applied to the Northwest Europe campaign, point to the need to reevaluate the dominant theories on combat cohesion. It is concluded that strategy, understood as an iterative multilevel process rather than a level of war or activity situated only as a bridge between national policy and tactics, lies at the heart of any understanding of combat cohesion.

Helion Press, 2019

Since the late 1970s, anglophone and German military literature has been fascinated by the Wehrmacht‘s command system, especially the practice of Auftragstaktik. There have been many descriptions of the doctrine and examinations of its historical origins, as well as unflattering comparisons with the approaches of the British and American Armies prior to their adoption of Mission Command in the late 1980s. Almost none of these, however, have sought to understand the different approaches to command in the context of a fundamental characteristic of warfare – friction. This book seeks to address that gap.First, the nature of friction, and the potential command responses to it, are considered, in order to develop a typology of eight command approaches, testing each approach to identify their relative effectiveness and requirements for success. Second, the British and German Armies’ doctrines of command during the period are examined, in order to reveal similarities and differences in relation to their perspective on the nature of warfare and the most appropriate responses. Third, the interaction of these different command doctrines is traced through a series of key battles, allowing the strengths and weaknesses of each to be highlighted and the typology to be tested. The result will be a new and deeper understanding of both the nature of command as a response to friction, and the factors that need to be in place in order to allow a given command approach to achieve success.The book therefore represents a sequel to my earlier work, Command or Control? Command, Training and Tactics in the British and German Armies, 1888-1918 (London: Cass, 1995), in that it takes the conceptual model of command developed there to a deeper level, and also takes the story up to the start of Second World War.

British Journal for Military History, 2019

Responding to the crisis posed by the battle of the Somme, in late 1916 the German army introduced new defensive tactics. It has been suggested that formal, top-down doctrine was a less important driver of this change than the bottom-up system of after-action reports, and that once initial resistance was overcome the new tactics were successfully adopted throughout the army. This article draws on little-studied archival material to reveal how doctrine evolved by stages in a complex combination of action, after-action reports, personalities and the high command’s desire to impose greater top-down control. Throughout this period, doctrine remained key to tactical change, but its implementation was patchier than the German army’s reputation suggests.

Bulletin of the Auckland Museum, 2021

What are the origins of the ‘myths’ that have come to dominate popular memory of the First World War in Britain? Perceptions of the conflict as a bloody exercise in futility, orchestrated by inept generals, and fought in fields of mud are undoubtedly unrepresentative. Yet, far from pure fiction, such impressions can be historicised. Drawing on wider research into soldiers’ perception of crisis during 1914-1918, this piece argues that the kernel of many of these ‘myths’ can be found in the lived experience of the western front in 1917.

Canadian Military History, 2019

The aim of this dissertation is to examine the contribution that the Indian forces had on the Allied war effort concentrating on the forces sent to the Western Front. Almost 140,000 troops served on this Front and their contributions have generally been buried deep in the writings on the First World War. It is hoped that this work will be able to highlight the importance of the Indian corps and serve as a testament to those who left their country with no personal grievance in the war and fought for their Imperial Ruler. This work aims to show that the Indian forces had an important role to play and during the period of study ensured that Britain, was at the least, able to create enough soldiers to take over on the Western Front. The aim of the work is to consider the structure of the army, track the motivations for fighting of the troops, their experiences on the front, and fluctuations of morale in the trenches as well as an analysis considering potential failures of the Indian Expeditionary Force. It will consider whether the Corps were a failure or whether they fulfilled the role set to them. It will also seek to analyse the issues regarding loyalty to Britain and whether disloyalty ever manifested itself whilst on the Front.

J. Baev en K. Grozev (eds.), World War One (1914-1918). 40th International Congress of Military History Varna, Bulgaria (31 August – 5 September 2014), Sofia, St. Kliment Ohridski University Press, 2015, p. 765-790., 2015

The First World War is particularly associated with the bloody offensives on the Western front. Only a few months after its outbreak, the war got stuck in an unprecedented stalemate. The various armies tried to break through the front with new and heavier weaponry, but systematically, offensives ended in a failure with tens of thousands of casualties. This article considers the reasons for this by analysing the various ways by which attack and defence were organized. We also look at how the Germans almost achieved a breakthrough in Spring 1918 and how it was finally to the Allies to win the war.

Intelligence and National Security, 2017

War in History, 2015

Drawing on theories of problems in warfare being ‘tame’ or ‘wicked’, this article explores continuity and changes in British and German doctrine through examination of wording, emphasis, and approach in field service manuals. This reveals significant continuities in German doctrine, especially the emphasis on initiative, but growing focus on rapid decision-making, coupled with forward command, to achieve surprise. British doctrine also displayed continuity, focused on controlling the battle and reluctance to allow subordinates to exercise initiative. A shift in British doctrine, from one similar to the German model towards a more restrictive approach, is identified between 1905 and 1909.

Standing at over a million men strong, the Royal Artillery was larger than the Royal Navy during the First World War; representing, by 1916, almost a quarter of all British soldiers serving on the Western Front. In the course of a war hallmarked by its industrial nature and scale, artillery evolved to become the premier killing arm, responsible for more than 50% of all casualties (Bailey 2004: xviii). A “mediator of change on many levels” (Crawford 2009: 8), field guns and heavy artillery pieces also helped to reshape Flanders’ fields, to leave an enduring mark on the landscape which resonates, via the medium of the annual harvest of unexploded ordnance, to the present day.Recognised for their ability to destroy, neutralise, harass or suppress, the guns also provided the war with an unnatural ‘heartbeat’; with artillery’s fire attuned to the conflict’s industrial tempo; each gun battery a mobile factory designed to efficiently transform live artillery rounds into empty brass shell-cases, with human beings subordinated as ‘gun numbers’ to the greater needs of attritional science and technology.Taking a “multidisciplinary, anthropologically informed” approach (Saunders 2012: iix), and drawing upon memoirs, letters and war diaries, contemporary art and photographic images as sources of primary evidence, this paper focuses on a hitherto unexplored dimension of the Great War to explore the sensorial and experiential impact of the conflict on the gunners who served the most prolific British artillery piece of the war: the Quick Firing 18-Pounder Field Gun (the ‘18-pdr’).

War & Society, 2019

This article investigates the impact of the Battle of France, 1940 on the British Army's subsequent investigations in the fighting impacted on the Royal Air Force (RAF) and the development of tactical air power in Britain. The investigations by the British Army placed the RAF in a difficult position with regards the provision of air support in Britain. This investigation was severely flawed from the outset with its being chaired by a senior officer who was well known to have a hatred of the RAF and joint-service solutions and blamed the failure of the British Expeditionary Force on a lack of air support from the RAF. It fundamentally misread German tactical and operational doctrine, particularly the application of air power. It will highlight the position of the RAF after the Battle of France and the discussions between the Air Ministry and War Office over the creation of an Army Co-operation Command. Through analysing how Army Co-operation Command was created by the RAF, the RAF's attitude towards tactical air support will be made clear. Army Co-operation Command was created to appear to be a solution to the problem of RAF-Army relations on the surface but as the Army began to work with Army Co-operation Command they realised it had been created to achieve very little in practice.

Third year paper analysing the key changes in warfare between 1914 and 1918.